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Abstract 
Despite the market dominance of WeChat in contemporary China, we currently know 
little about its significance for Chinese politics. WeChat enables strong tie 
communicative networks, which prior research indicates is consequential for contentious 
political engagement. Drawing on evidence from focus groups conducted with Chinese 
citizens in the UK, we reveal that although WeChat users are often connected through 
offline social and professional networks, contentious politics manifests on the app only 
under a narrow range of circumstances. Furthermore, political contention on WeChat is 
reported by our respondents to be largely confined to matters of ‘interest-oriented’ and/or 
‘safe’ topics that do not challenge the wider political system. This trend is driven by a 
combination of political and cultural dynamics which we elaborate in a theoretically-
informed thematic analysis, arguing that engaging with the concept of guanxi provides 
more insight into the political repercussions of WeChat in China than a focus on tie-
strength.  
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Introduction  
When we convened a series of focus groups with Chinese citizens temporarily residing in 
the UK to discuss a mobile phone application called ‘WeChat’, it was immediately 
apparent that the app plays a significant role in their lives: 
 
[I use WeChat] uncountable times (Respondent #7 female 20-29) 
 
[I use WeChat] Every minute (Respondent #10 male 20-29) 
 
Checking updates on WeChat is the first thing I do in the morning and the last 
thing I do before going to bed in the evening (Respondent #17 female 30-39) 
Such intense engagement with WeChat is not unusual among its users. Research 
published by WeChat’s parent company estimates that 61% of account holders open the 
app more than 10 times per day and that more than half spend over an hour a day using it 
(Tencent Penguin Intelligence and CAICT, 2016). This high frequency of usage is 
coupled with extensive penetration in contemporary China. By the end of 2016, 
approximately 80% of China’s 695 million mobile internet users were estimated to have a 
WeChat account (CNNIC, 2017) - making it by some distance China’s most popular 
mobile phone application. Over the course of 2017, just over 23% of Chinese netizens 
engaged with government WeChat official accounts (CNNIC, 2018).  
As such, there is strong evidence for the contention that WeChat is both massively 
popular and increasingly integrated into civic life in today’s China. Harwit (2016) 
observes that WeChat’s growth has occurred at the expense of Social Networking Sites 
(SNSs) – indicating that an important shift has occurred in how Chinese citizens are 
experiencing the internet. And yet, while studies of WeChat are emerging (Belair-
Gagnon et al., 2018; Chen, 2017; DeLuca et al., 2016; Harwit, 2016; Lien and Cao, 
2016); scholarly investigations of its intersection with Chinese politics are strikingly 
absent. We begin to address this lacuna, focusing our attention on the question of how 
Chinese political contention is being enabled and shaped by WeChat.  
In the following section, we present our theoretical framework. We begin by 
situating our research within literature that has identified the interplay between digital 
technologies and the communicative social networks that they enable as an influential 
factor in the study of contentious politics. We discuss widely established findings 
surrounding the implications of tie strength for participation in contentious politics and 
the shaping of contentious political movements. We outline research showing that digital 
platforms can affect the tie strength of communicative networks that engage in 
contentious politics. We then argue that the communicative networks enabled by WeChat 
are likely to be characterised by relatively stronger offline ties between users than 
conventional SNSs – which implies that the growing dominance of WeChat may have 
substantial implications for contentious politics in China. We conclude by discussing the 
concept of guanxi (literally ‘relationship’ or ‘personal connection’) which is the subject 
of well-developed China-focused sociological, cultural and business literatures (for an 
overview, see: Barbalet, 2015) and is of emerging importance in the study of social 
movements in China (Qi, 2017). We argue that considering guanxi instead of tie strength 
leads to more equivocal expectations regarding the political ramifications of WeChat.   
We then move to our empirical investigation, which involved a series of focus 
groups conducted with UK-resident Chinese citizens in the Spring of 2017, including two 
groups comprised of young people who expressed a strong interest in media and politics. 
We explain that our approach represents a ‘most likely’ critical case selection strategy 
which, while limited in terms of representativeness, maximizes the likelihood that we will 
observe contentious political usage of WeChat among Chinese citizens. Employing 
Braun and Clarke’s (2006) analytic process, we extract a series of themes from the 
transcripts of these focus groups. We overlay our prior theoretical discussion with these 
thematic insights; leading us to assert that politically contentious discussion or 
information sharing on WeChat arises only under a relatively narrow set of conditions 
and that forms of political contention that directly target central government or regime 
structures are particularly unlikely to emerge. This set of findings leads us to argue that 
guanxi proves a more penetrating analytical construct for understanding the relationship 
between WeChat and Chinese political contention than social tie strength. We conclude 
that WeChat’s dominance of the mobile app market in today’s China generates a system 
re-enforcing rather than a democratizing political dynamic.       
Theorising the relationship between WeChat, social 
connections and China’s contentious politics  
Contentious Politics, Social Networks and Digital Communication 
Technologies 
There is a growing body of research that examines the role of digital communication 
technologies in contentious politics, often under the heading of ‘digital activism’ (for a 
recent overview, see the collection introduced by Kaun and Uldman, 2018). In this sub-
section, we begin by discussing research that establishes the centrality of social ties to 
contentious politics. We go on to outline the existence of research showing that popular 
digital communication technologies can enable certain types of communicative social 
networks which become consequential for contentious politics. We then elaborate 
research demonstrating that the nature of this process is not constant across all types of 
digital platforms – different platforms enable communicative social networks with 
varying levels of tie strength.   
It is well-established that social tie dynamics can both drive people towards 
contentious politics and affect the nature of contentious political movements (Diani and 
McAdam, 2003; Granovetter, 1973; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993). Passy (2003) 
differentiates three functions of social ties in mobilisation around contentious politics: the 
socialization function; the structural-connection function, and the decision-shaping 
function. The socialization function enables individuals to construct their identity in a 
group and consolidate political consciousness regarding a given issue; the structural-
connection function allows individuals to access mobilization opportunities and convert 
political consciousness into action; and finally, through the decision-shaping function, 
social ties exert influence on perceptions of the costs and benefits of participation in 
political contention.  
The concept of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ social ties, as articulated by Granovetter 
(1973), is vital to this discussion. The notion of social ties having varying degrees of 
‘strength’ refers to the nature of relationships between a given individual and others 
within their social network. Weak(er) tie connections can be characterized as 
‘acquaintance’ relationships, where there is relatively little direct contact, intimacy, or 
emotional intensity. Ties become progressively stronger as one moves towards close 
friends and family members. Social tie strength can be consequential for patterns of 
political contestation at both individual and group levels. While weak tie networks hold 
the potential for contentious political movements to spread beyond well-established 
groups and affect wider society (ibid.), strong tie networks have been found to encourage 
participation in contentious politics, particularly where this entails an element of personal 
risk (McAdam, 1986). Strong ties also provide a foundation for building the solidarity 
and reciprocity that is required to sustain contentious political movements (Granovetter, 
1973). 
There is evidence that digital communication technology can catalyse processes 
that connect individuals’ social networks to their propensity to participate in contentious 
social movements, as well as shaping the extent to which movements rely on individual 
leaders and centralised bureaucratic control structures. Liu (2014; 2015) argues that 
mobile telephone-connected communicative networks have initiated and sustained 
several instances of contentious politics in China. SNSs also represent a technology that 
can affect the politically contentious usage of an individual’s social ties (Baym, 2015). 
For instance, Tufekci and Wilson (2012: 266) argue that during the Arab Spring: 
‘Facebook (…) provided a means for Egyptians to connect with their large social 
networks all at once. For the first time in modern Egyptian history, political activists and 
others could have pointed, broad, and semipublic political discussions across vast social 
networks.’ SNSs can also facilitate connections between individuals that may otherwise 
not have been made, captured by the concept of the activation of latent ties 
(Haythornthwaite, 2002). Furthermore, when digital communication technologies 
intersect with certain types of social and organisational networks, they can transform the 
character of a contentious political movement (Bennet and Segerberg, 2012).  
However, not all digital technologies facilitate identical patterns of 
communicative network generation and connection to contentious politics. Liu (2014; 
2015) emphasizes the importance of strong ties among individuals who shared each 
other’s mobile telephone numbers for effective political contention. Valenzuela et al. 
(2018) find that contentious political participation is facilitated differently depending on 
the SNS platform: via stronger-tie networks on Facebook and weaker-tie networks on 
Twitter. Thus, variation in the tie strength of communicative networks occurs across 
alternative digital communication platforms. Building on this insight, in the next section 
we explore how WeChat compares with conventional SNSs regarding the tie strength of 
the communicative networks that it enables.   
Theorising how the networks that WeChat enables differ regarding 
tie strength when compared with SNSs   
WeChat can be categorised as a Mobile Instant Messaging Application (Church and de 
Olivera, 2013: 352) or ‘chat app’ (Barot and Oren, 2015), that is, a mobile technology 
platform of which the primary function is to allow users to send real-time messages to 
individuals or groups of contacts at no cost via the internet. There are important 
differences between SNSs and chat apps when it comes to the nature of the network 
articulation that they facilitate and the capacity that they afford users to traverse 
connections made by others within the network. Network articulation as discussed by 
boyd and Ellison (2007: 111) in their definition of SNSs entails making one’s network 
visible to those with whom one shares a connection (and vice versa). Chat apps rarely 
provide this functionality. Instead, accessing other users’ profiles typically requires some 
form of prior direct connection, most commonly in the form of a mobile phone number. 
Mutual friends who share an individual’s contact details can also establish connections. 
Group chats are visible only to interlocutors who have either established or been invited 
to join a group. Finally, many chat apps apply limitations to the scale of any given group 
discussion – for instance, WeChat doesn’t facilitate chats among groups of more than 500 
participants (Harwit, 2016). These features of chat apps combine to set the bar for 
connection higher than SNSs.  
The clarity of this point is somewhat occluded by the fact that WeChat is layering 
on SNS-like functionality – as exemplified by its ‘Moments’ feature, introduced in 2012. 
This feature is described by Bhagat (2016: np) as ‘a mix of Facebook and Twitter’. Barot 
and Orwen argue that, as such hybrid developments continue to take place, the ‘point 
where a messaging app begins and ends will begin to blur’ (2015: 62). Nonetheless, there 
are reasons to suspect that an emphasis on connecting networks with relatively strong 
offline ties will persevere as WeChat continues to evolve. As Wu (2014) points out, the 
sequencing by which additional functionalities layer on to a chat app is important – the 
initial structure of the network may dilute but is unlikely to be fully eroded. Indeed, to the 
extent that WeChat waters down the strength of the connective ties among members of its 
networks, it risks losing its unique selling point.  
Looking at the available evidence, we can see that a relatively higher threshold for 
connection (compared with other Chinese SNSs) has been observed in existing studies of 
WeChat networks. For instance, Harwit (2016: 2) notes the ‘limited group orientation’ 
that characterizes WeChat, while another WeChat user commented that, when introduced 
to a discussion group, ‘I literally needed someone to tell me the group existed, then to 
invite me into that group, to bring me into the circle of trust’ (Belair-Gagnon et al., 2016: 
9). This invocation of a ‘circle of trust’ has clear implications for the nature of the ties 
that connect users within chat app networks, namely that they feature a higher portion of 
strong-tie connections than conventional SNSs. To the extent that this is true, the 
literature outlined in the previous section would lead us to anticipate that WeChat may 
serve as a vector for recruitment to contentious politics and holds the potential to shape 
contentious political movements.  
Guanxi as a conception of social connection and its implications 
for the role of WeChat in China’s contentious politics 
In this section, we introduce the concept of guanxi, which has a wider and deeper 
meaning than the term ‘social ties’ (Barbalet, 2015; Fei, 1992; Gold et al. 2002; King, 
1991) and consequently leads to more equivocal expectations regarding how WeChat 
may affect political contestation in China. Qi (2017: 2) defines guanxi as: ‘a form of 
long-term interpersonal relation formed and governed by implicit social norms, including 
xinyong (trustworthiness), mianzi (face), renqing (norms of interpersonal behavior), 
reciprocity in favour exchange, and obligation.’ Barbalet argues that these diverse aspects 
of the concept are made coherent by guanxi’s ‘reputational focus’ and emphasis on 
repeated interaction where ‘guanxi exchanges never occur as isolated events, they are 
serially connected and configured in a network pattern’ (2015: 1038; see also: Gold et al. 
2002).   
As such, guanxi acts as a reputational ‘identity-marker’ (Barbalet, 2015: 1039). 
However, guanxi also provides a means through which social relations are open to 
manipulation for instrumental ends. Guanxi is partly a form of social capital that ‘is 
accumulated with the intention of converting it into economic, political, or symbolic 
capital’ (Gold et al., 2002: 7). ‘Modern’ guanxi in urban settings tends to have a more 
instrumental construction and differs from the more traditional expressive aspects that 
obtain in a rural gift economy and based on feelings of warmth and reciprocity (Chen and 
Chen, 2004). In an instrumental context, guanxi must be produced, cultivated, and 
maintained consciously (Barbalet, 2015; Gold et al., 2002). When employing guanxi for 
mutual benefits is the key objective, risking guanxi could have negative consequences for 
one’s political, economic and personal life. This notion of risk aversion is enhanced by 
the informational opacity and mutual monitoring that characterizes instrumental guanxi 
exchanges. Barbalet (2015) notes that the operation of instrumental guanxi conforms to a 
constraining logic of obligation, as opposed to the enabling logic of influence which is 
central to the instrumental use of social ties.  
These insights lead us toward a conception of social connections which 
emphasizes their restraining qualities, as opposed to the enabling, or agency-enhancing 
aspects of social ties. This conclusion rests on an understanding of the interplay between 
culture and political/institutional context. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been 
notable for its capacity to leverage the surveillance potentialities of the internet to deepen 
its political hegemony (Freedom House, 2017; Kalathil and Boas, 2010). He and Su 
(2018) note that the Chinese state has been particularly successful in adapting to regime-
threatening contention post-2010, through a combination of targeting and (publicly) 
punishing prominent political dissidents and nationally-coordinated repression campaigns 
directed against digitally-enabled regime-threatening contentious politics networks. Qi 
(2017) argues that guanxi is employed by the state to sustain the status quo, via strategies 
ranging from persuasion to coercion through the connections of law enforcement and 
secret police officials to their guanxi networks, concluding that guanxi is a key plank in 
suppressive strategies employed by the state.  
As such, while the multidimensionality, ability to incorporate expressive use, 
depth and long time-horizon aspects of guanxi might offer important resources for actors 
employing social connections via WeChat to engage in contentious politics, the political 
context of contemporary China lessens the likelihood that these enabling qualities will 
prevail. Reputation-protection, risk aversion, informational opacity, and interpersonal 
monitoring are all aspects that both separate guanxi from social networks conceptually 
(Barbalet, 2015) and, in a context of intense monitoring and use of suppressive strategies 
by the Chinese state, point towards greater pessimism regarding the capacity of WeChat 
to spur engagement in Chinese contentious politics.  
Empirical Analysis  
Data and Methodology  
This study draws on data gathered from three focus groups of active WeChat 
users conducted in the Spring of 2017. All participants were Chinese nationals on either 
student or visitor visas with the intention of returning to China after their time in the UK. 
Two focus groups involved students who combine high degrees of digital literacy with 
interest in digital media and politics. We denote these groups as ‘Student Group (SG) 1’ 
and ‘Student Group (SG) 2’ in subsequent discussion. A third group, labelled Non-
Student Group (NSG), is comprised of professionals who work in either the public or 
private sectors in China and are staying on short term visas in the UK, this group was not 
filtered by level of interest in media and politics. SG1 consisted of four male and two 
female students; SG2 was made up of two male and four female students; while the NSG 
group was comprised of four female participants and one male. Among a total of 17 
respondents, 10 were aged 20-29, and 7 were aged 30-39, capturing the age brackets 
within which the largest proportions of Chinese web users cluster (CNNIC, 2017: 49).  
While we acknowledge that our ability to paint a representative picture of the 
Chinese population is circumscribed by this methodological approach, we argue that 
these groups, particularly SG1 and SG2, represent ‘most likely’ (Flyvberg, 2006: 14) 
critical cases for the contention that WeChat represents a communication technology that 
can both facilitate and shape contentious politics in contemporary China. The logic of this 
approach to case selection has been memorably characterised by Levy as ‘the inverse 
Sinatra inference—if I cannot make it there, I cannot make it anywhere’ (2002: 442). Our 
strategy for contending that these groups represent ‘most likely’ critical cases operates at 
three levels. Firstly, SG1 and SG2 are composed of individuals who have expressed 
interest in media and politics, marking them out as more likely than a typical citizen to 
engage in political contestation using digital tools. Secondly, a key benefit of talking to 
Chinese citizens in the UK is the relatively greater openness to discussing contentious 
political matters that characterises the UK cultural, legal and political environment 
relative to China. While we cannot eliminate the possibility that participants will avoid 
‘on the record’ discussion of their engagement with political contention due to fear of 
persecution, the UK context lessens this risk. Thirdly, focus groups’ principal advantage 
for our purposes is that they can encourage participants to share ideas that may be 
sensitive and thus difficult to elicit (Vaughn et al., 1996) and our ethical protocol, which 
was shared with respondents to obtain informed consent, specified that respondents 
would be anonymized. As such, the composition of our focus groups, the context of the 
fieldwork, and the research technique employed cohere to generate a ‘most likely’ 
scenario for the observation of politically contentious politics being enabled and shaped 
by WeChat among Chinese citizens.  
Our conceptualisation of ‘contentious politics’ chimes with our ‘most likely’ 
critical case selection approach in covering the widest possible ambit of contentious 
politics to maximise our likelihood of observing the occurrence of such politics on 
WeChat. Our approach mirrors that of Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 4), who situate 
contentious politics at the intersection of three concepts: contention, collective action and 
politics. In conducting our focus groups, we understood all three of these concepts in 
their broadest sense. Our conceptualisation of contention ranges from challenging 
political authority structures to questioning dominant societal norms. Similarly, collective 
action is understood to range from participation in protest activities to the act of engaging 
in a contentious political discussion. Finally, politics is defined as incorporating the many 
levels at which political power is exercised: from the international to the national to the 
local and the personal.  
We followed conventional guidelines in conducting our focus groups 
(Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009), using a topic guide to shape the discussion, which was led by 
a moderator. The focus group interviews were conducted in Chinese and each discussion 
lasted between 70 and 90 minutes. In the design of the focus groups, we adopted an open 
strategy – inviting participants to talk about how they use WeChat for engaging in 
contentious political discussion as well as real or hypothetical contentious political 
activities.  
Our analytical approach is a theoretically-informed thematic analysis. We 
followed a methodology for the thematic analysis of focus group data established by 
Braun and Clark (2006). We began by creating a set of translated transcripts derived from 
digital audio recordings of the focus groups. We grouped points, perceptions and stories 
according to Passy’s (2003) framework as bearing on socialization functions, structural 
connection functions or decision-making functions of social ties in activating 
participation in contentious politics. We then examined each set of texts to ascertain 
whether and how WeChat influences the relationship between social connections and 
engagement with contentious politics – extracting key insights and themes. An overview 
of the major themes extracted is provided in Figure 1, and each theme is explored in 
greater detail in the discussion that follows.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1  
 
 
 
Findings: WeChat and the socialization function  
The role of digital technologies in the political socialisation process centres on their 
functions regarding the provision of information and engagement of users in discussion. 
We found two consistent themes that emerged under this heading across our focus 
groups. Firstly, WeChat is often used as an alternative news source for those who seek 
interpretative information about current affairs. This interpretation comes both in the 
conventional sense of discovering opinions about news items and in a more 
technologically-specific sense of using one’s network to gauge the significance of news 
items. The second recurrent theme that emerged under this heading related to how social 
connections embodied via chat apps can either inhibit or liberate political discussion – 
depending on a combination of the offline patterns of levels of trust existing between 
group members, the levels of offline political discussion that characterise a given chat 
group, and the presence or absence of professional connections among group members.  
We begin by examining ideas that centre on WeChat as an alternative news 
source, focusing on its SNS-like communicative affordances. WeChat has features that 
combine attributes of both Twitter and Facebook. It enables users to access information 
from both gongzhonghao (‘official accounts’ in WeChat English version) which are 
Twitter-like news feed accounts run by organizations or individuals, and pengyouquan 
(‘moments’ in WeChat’s English version), similar to Facebook’s ‘news feed’. Users 
receive ‘pushed’ information from both types of network. 11 of our 17 respondents listed 
‘obtaining information about current affairs’ as one of their key motivations for using 
WeChat. According to our respondents, political information received on WeChat public 
accounts is not expected to be broad, objective or impartial. Instead, users expect 
customised background information and opinion about current affairs: 
WeChat could be called an information source [or] an important node in the web 
of online information... I don’t use WeChat for breaking news. I use Weibo 
instead. Weibo has a broad range of news sources […] I use WeChat for in-depth 
reporting and opinion pieces. Official accounts on WeChat are not bound by the 
limits of length etc. and often provide insights into current events that I’m 
interested in (Respondent #7 female 20-29) 
We also noted that news feeds from friends are used to gauge the prominence of 
certain issues: 
I follow the current affairs news shared by my friends via their pengyouquan. 
Maybe it is not always the hottest topic because one of my friends shared it, but it 
must be a hot topic if everyone’s sharing it on pengyouquan. (Respondent #8 
female 20-29) 
However, the ability to curate and share news via pengyouquan does not 
guarantee the unbridled expression of individual opinion – instead, it emerged that the 
nature of the relationships which users enjoy with their contacts offline act as a crucial 
determinant of whether contentious political communication takes place on WeChat. A 
first consideration is the extent of trust among members of a given group. Participants 
reported a strategy of limiting contentious political discussion to small networks 
characterised by high levels of inter-personal trust.   
I comment on current affairs within my classmate’s group because we have 
known each other for a very long time and known each other well. Even my 
opinion is wrong; they wouldn’t mind. On pengyouquan or in other groups, I 
rarely make any comments at all. (Respondent #17 female 30-39) 
This notion that trust is a vital pre-requisite to engaging in contentious political 
discussion appears to be driven by the lack of anonymity that characterises WeChat. For 
instance, Respondent #7 (female 20-29) adaptively comments on current affairs on the 
more public platform Weibo under her Xiaohao (literal meaning: little account) 
pseudonym, while avoiding similar discussions on WeChat:   
I don’t dare to comment on news or current affairs [on WeChat] because it 
contains too much personal information. Other people can easily recognize me. I 
use my anonymous Xiaohao [on Weibo] in commenting, especially when the 
comments are criticism. … I have one Xiaohao which contains zero personal 
information, and I never use it to post or repost news. I use this account to solely 
speak my mind on issues relevant to women’s rights. Those who endorse 
patriarchal viewpoints […] often attack me.  
 
Respondent #8 (female, 20-29) shared similar thoughts: 
 
Weibo is a very public space for me, and it makes me feel relaxed, I can express 
myself freely. … but on WeChat, I’m very careful, and I care about my image in 
the eyes of family and friends. 
Data from SG1 and SG2 shows that a second pre-requisite for political 
conversation to be initiated on WeChat is that political discussions are mirrored offline 
and considered acceptable within a group.  
I only discuss current affairs with close male friends, sometimes on a one-to-one 
basis, just like we meet in real life, face-to-face. I wouldn’t want to discuss 
current affairs or comment on news in public on WeChat.  (Respondent #10 male 
20-29). 
 
You have your teachers, classmates, families, relatives, colleagues connected on 
WeChat. These are not the kind of people with whom you would like to share 
your views on current affairs. (Respondent #6 male 20-29) 
There was discussion among the NSG of how offline ties could inhibit political 
discussion within the context of work-related communication. This group generally 
regarded contentious political discussion on WeChat as ‘annoying’ or ‘inappropriate’ 
behaviour. One participant shared an anecdote about her colleague who was warned by 
his line manager to stop discussing current affairs within WeChat social groups: 
It is not appropriate for him to expose his political views among colleagues, is it? 
(…) We are not interested in knowing what he thinks of North Korea (Respondent 
#16 female 30-39). 
Thus, it seems that WeChat serves to initiate and sustain contentious political 
socialisation only in a rather narrow range of circumstances. Very high levels of inter-
personal trust, prior offline patterns of political discussion, and non-work contexts all 
appear to be necessary pre-requisites for sharing one’s political opinion with a given 
group of contacts. These findings appear to chime more closely with the constraining 
elements of guanxi than with the enabling dynamic implied by a focus on tie strength. It 
appears that risk aversion and reputation management operate to induce silence toward 
political issues on WeChat as a rule of thumb, with a quite specific set of circumstances 
having to come together for this rule to be discarded.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2  
 
Findings: WeChat and structural-connection function 
The structural-connection function of social networks within contentious politics captures 
their ability to facilitate mobilisation and collective political action (Passy, 2003). In our 
analysis of the focus group transcripts under this heading, two key sub-themes emerged. 
Firstly, a consistent notion was that WeChat is well-suited to organise a protest on 
matters of material self-interest to groups or individuals. Secondly, most of the WeChat 
use described under this heading centred on resource generation (regarding practical and 
material support), rather than information diffusion, which appears to be more easily 
achieved via more ‘public’ applications such as micro-blogging platform Weibo. These 
themes and the sub-themes to which they give rise are represented in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3  
 
We begin with a discussion of the theme of the nature of the contention facilitated 
by WeChat. He and Su (2018: 402) contend that most public acts of contention in 
contemporary China are ‘interest-oriented’, focusing on the material well-being of 
participants and targeting geographically-localized antagonists - thus posing little 
substantive or ideological threat to the broader political system. They contrast this with 
rarer ‘value-oriented’ acts of political contention where participants ‘do not have direct 
material interests in movement claims’. According to He and Su, value-oriented 
contentions are far more likely than interest-oriented contentions to become ‘anti-system’ 
because of the broad nature of the demands that they generate and their statewide scope. 
As we can see in the following comment of a respondent in SG1, the ‘interest-oriented’ 
characterization appears to offer the best fit to WeChat-enabled contention: 
To the best of my knowledge, much so-called civic activism centres around the 
well-being of those participants’ children. I know one case involving a food 
poisoning incident in a primary school. When children were given poisoned food 
by the school by accident, the school managers tried very hard to hide the truth 
from the public. They claimed that those children were suffering from a 
contagious disease. Suspicious parents then shared information among themselves 
in WeChat groups about symptoms of their children and comparing medical 
notes. They eventually found out the truth by exchanging information among 
themselves (Respondent #1 female 20-29) 
 
As Fei argues, ‘social relationships in China possess a self-centred quality’ 
(1992:65) and the egocentric nature of guanxi facilitates ‘elastic networks’ which can 
strengthen (or weaken) existing ties based on individuals’ conscious decisions. Social 
connections among WeChat users appear particularly powerful in connecting individuals 
affected by interest-oriented issues. For instance, one of our focus group participants 
shared this experience:  
Grassroots protest can be easily organised online. In my hometown, when the 
municipal government decided to give the green light to the proposal of building a 
chemical factory in the city centre, people organised a ‘stroll’ [euphemism for 
protest] by connecting on WeChat. When there is a sufficient number of people, 
civic action is possible.  In Southeast China those economically well-off regions, 
urban dwellers are very much against chemical factories or other heavy pollutants. 
Such activities are very common (Respondent #3 male 20-29).  
The social connections that are embedded in WeChat are regarded as a key 
support-building resource for instances of interest-oriented contention. When asked what 
digital tools they would choose if they were to recruit supporters around a hypothetical 
campaign of political contestation, respondents’ first choice was unanimously WeChat: 
I would start from people that I know well as they are the ones can be convinced. 
That means WeChat [would be the chosen digital tool]. I’ll contact individuals 
separately. One-to-one. (Respondent #9 female 20-29) 
 
WeChat, as it influences people’s hearts and feelings. (Respondent #8 female 20-
29) 
 
WeChat, as I’ve known every friend on WeChat.  (Respondent #10 male 20-29) 
 
WeChat. I could try to convince others and also influence them with my 
behaviour and activity. I used to volunteer to teach in the rural area in China for a 
year. My activity influenced friends [on WeChat] and some of them, about 20 to 
30 people, supported me by donation of money and books. (Respondent #11 
female 20-29) 
While WeChat thus has an important role to play in initiating contentious political 
activism; more ‘public’ SNSs such as Weibo can magnify the impact of local issues by 
inserting them into the national public agenda, as narrated by one respondent about the 
school food poisoning incident discussed above:  
After a lengthy discussion among themselves within a WeChat group, these 
parents published their story on Weibo. Once it is posted on Weibo, it turned from 
a local issue into a national issue and gained support from people across the 
country. It is a popular solution now in China: if the local government does not 
attend the issue, the solution is to ‘put this issue on [Weibo] hot search’ [re sou]. 
(Respondent #1 female 20-29) 
This finding echoes our earlier discussion of the respective roles of strong and 
weak ties in initiating/sustaining versus disseminating contentious political movements, 
indicating that WeChat-enabled strong-tie communicative social networks have 
considerable potential when it comes to initiating and sustaining contentious political 
engagement, while conventional SNSs have the edge in information diffusion. However, 
the efficacy of WeChat is limited to connecting individuals around interest-oriented 
contentions –echoing the caution-inducing effects of guanxi in a politically repressive 
context, as well as its emphasis on obligation over influence. We find a similar pattern of 
circumscribed contestation when it comes to the decision-making function.  
Findings: WeChat and the decision-making function 
The decision-making function in Passy’s (2003) framework refers to the role of social 
networks in enabling and motivating individuals to decide to participate in contentious 
political activities. Two themes emerged from our transcript under this heading: the 
notion of a ‘risk assessment’ of potentially contentious activities; and the role of 
monitoring and reporting of content. These ideas and their sub-themes are visualized in 
Figure 4 below. 
 
FIGURE 4  
 
WeChat users in our focus groups were very much aware of the potential danger 
associated with online posting and information exchange in China, leading them to 
develop strategies for assessing and minimising risk. In a context where even acts of 
interest-oriented political contention can escalate unexpectedly and result in punishment 
for those involved (He and Su, 2018), it is unsurprising that caution and self-censorship 
are widely reported: 
I received a friend’s invitation to vote via WeChat for her father for his 
participation in a calligraphy competition. For such activities, of course, I cast my 
vote. If the invitation is about policy or politics, I won’t take part. I do tend to 
protect myself. (Respondent #8 female 20-29) 
 
I try to leave no traces at all online... I’m even regretting having a WeChat 
account now. I used to make sarcastic comments on current affairs online and 
later found my account blocked. (Respondent #12 male 20-29) 
 
Freedom of speech is not quite a reality in China. […] Say, even if you post 
comments on WeChat, you could face no response at all. (Respondent #14 female 
30-39) 
However, it would be overly simplistic to dismiss the role of WeChat in any form 
of political contention on the basis of the above comments. For instance, respondent #7 
discussed the following practice:  
I am still posting on messages against gender discrimination in employment on 
both Weibo and WeChat. I might have convinced some people. Any social reform 
starts from someone till everybody gains awareness. When I spend some time 
every day on such ‘trivial’ issues, I persuade someone, that’s my efforts made in 
making social progress. (Respondent #7 female 20-29) 
Gender equality has been a political issue of which discussion tolerated, if it is not 
endorsed, by the central government in China since the late 1970s (Wang, 2008). 
Therefore, while gender equality may qualify as a ‘value-oriented’ area of contention, it 
arguably fails to meet the threshold of ‘anti-system’ political contention – thus presenting 
a tolerable risk profile for individuals sufficiently motivated to air their thoughts on the 
topic.  
A second key theme arises from the fact that WeChat users in China face 
uncertainty regarding whether or when their chats are monitored for political content. In 
recent years, closure of the internet as a space for political resistance was exacerbated by 
a growing insistence on ‘real name registration’ for web services (Freedom House, 2017). 
This phenomenon co-exists with a regulatory environment which places substantial 
responsibility on service providers to monitor and report politically subversive content as 
well as facilitating reporting by individual users of politically contentious content posted 
by other users. One respondent from the NSG discussion explained that he reported 
several WeChat messages for a range of reasons:  
I came across many pornographic, violent, rumour-filled, or politically offensive 
messages. I reported those posts to the administrator. It’s easy to do – you only 
need to click the ‘report’ button at the bottom of the post. I’m not working for the 
government or anything; I just don’t like the fact that some people are being 
irresponsible with their online comments. There are a lot of posts about social 
injustice from my hometown; I don’t like to read them. A, I don’t know how 
truthful those messages are; B, I can’t do anything about it. (Respondent #13 male 
30-39) 
Here, as with our earlier analysis of discussion behaviours, trust and strong offline 
connections appear to be an important part of the equation in deciding to undertake or 
organise politically contentious activities via WeChat: 
If you are not familiar with everyone in the group, it’s best not to [approach other 
people for civic activities]. If other people don’t share your view, they could be 
offended and even report you. If you are reported, whatever activities you are 
planning will be killed in their cradle. (Respondent #1 female 20-29) 
 
 
Conclusions 
At the heart of our initial motivation for this research project was an intuition that the 
strong tie communicative networks that WeChat enables might catalyse the generation 
and shaping of a new era of Chinese contentious politics. Authors such as Gladwell 
(2010) have argued that the paucity of strong tie connections on SNSs was precisely what 
undermined claims that they could initiate and sustain revolutionary contentious political 
movements in authoritarian regimes. The importance of strong ties for initiating and 
sustaining contentious political action in challenging contexts is well-established, going 
back to the foundational work of Granovetter (1973). China’s domestic political regime 
certainly provides a challenging context for the development of contentious politics 
(Freedom House, 2017) and WeChat’s limited network articulation and traversing 
mechanisms set a high bar for connection – enabling strong tie communicative networks.  
However, we found that the narrowness of the circumstances in which contentious 
politics emerges as a topic for discussion on WeChat (limited to high trust connections 
which mirror a prior pattern of offline political discussion and do not overlap with 
professional networks) was striking. The limited range of interest-oriented and ‘safe’ 
topics on which WeChat-enabled contentious discussions and mobilisations centre was 
also a predominant theme. Taken in combination, these findings lead us to conclude that 
WeChat provides barren soil for contentious politics generally and is particularly inimical 
to generating ideas, connections or activities that may undermine the CCP regime. These 
conclusions should be set against our methodological approach, which was designed to 
provide research conditions that maximised our likelihood of observing of WeChat-
enabled political contention. While we cannot characterise the overall distribution of such 
activities across China’s WeChat users on the basis of our research, it seems to us 
implausible that less politically-interested users operating within China would be more 
likely to engage in political contention via WeChat than our respondents. We would 
encourage future researchers to build on the evidence base created for this paper by 
engaging with larger numbers of research subjects from a broader array of socio-
demographic groups in order to better grasp the scale and nuances of WeChat’s role in 
China’s contentious politics.   
Our findings can be at least partly explained by a combination of the suppressive 
strategies developed by the CCP and the advance of instrumental guanxi in contemporary 
Chinese society. Given the reputation management, risk aversion, the sense of constraint 
that characterises guanxi exchanges (Barbalet, 2015) and the punishments that anti-
system political contention entail (Freedom House, 2017; He and Su, 2018), it seems 
safer to say nothing about politics at all, rather than risk or strain one’s guanxi network. 
To the extent that WeChat facilitates political mobilisation through strong-tie networks, 
the increasingly instrumental nature of guanxi means that such facilitation is focused 
almost exclusively on the ends pursued by individuals and small groups in day-to-day life 
– resulting in limited, interest-oriented contention. Finally, the fact that the state uses 
guanxi networks as part of a repressive political strategy (Qi, 2017) means that each 
additional connection in a chat group represents an increased level of personal risk, rather 
than a mobilisation opportunity – meaning that only ‘safe’ or state-approved topics 
become a focus of politically contentious behaviours. Taken in the round, these 
considerations point to guanxi as a more penetrating conceptualisation of social 
connections than social ties for understanding how WeChat bears upon contemporary 
patterns of political contestation in China.   
Substantively, our analysis implies that WeChat’s dominance of the mobile phone 
application market acts as a stabilising force for the CCP regime. MacKinnon’s (2011: 
33) influential characterisation of China as a regime of ‘networked authoritarianism’ 
captures a situation where ‘while one party remains in control, a wide range of 
conversations about the country’s problems nonetheless rage on websites and social 
networking services.’ This idea is bolstered by the extensive analysis of Chinese social 
media censorship on SNSs conducted by King, Pan and Roberts (2013), which shows that 
critical commentary about the state, its leaders and policies often go uncensored although 
attempts to spur mobilisation around such criticism are rapidly shut down. Rauchfleisch 
and Schäfer (2015) observe numerous instances where the rapidity of digital reaction on 
SNSs to certain stories has meant that the state was unable to effectively exercise 
censorship. However, in the light of our findings, the growth of WeChat’s popularity at 
the expense of SNSs (Harwit, 2016) and the increasing incorporation of WeChat into the 
e-government infrastructure of China (CNNIC 2017; 2018) combine to indicate that even 
such limited assessments of the democratising potential of the internet in China may 
prove to be overly optimistic.  
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